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Pursuant to the provisions of Rule 24(c) , Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure, the Appellant submits the following 
Reply Brief. 
DESIGNATION OF PARTIES 
Pursuant to the provisions of Rule 24(d), Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure, the Plaintiff-Respondent (Kathe Homer) 
is designated herein as "Ms Homer"; the Defendant-Appellant 
(Stephen Homer) as "Mr Homer". 
RESPONSE TO RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
I 
THE APPELLANT'S BRIEF AND APPEAL 
Ms Homer asserts in her brief [pp. 6-8] that the brief 
of Mr Homer fails to comply with the Rules, in that it fails 
to correlate the assertions therein to the Record. Those 
statements are merely a ruse to sidetrack the Court from 
examining the meritorious issues raised in this appeal. 
Ms Homer's brief fails to identify even one particular 
where the "facts" or other issues, as stated in Mr Homer's 
brief, are in contravention to "the Record". 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF 
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The issues raised by Mr Homer are not 
factually-intensive, but rather are more "legal": these legal 
issues are evident from the result, as evidenced by the 
decree and the findings (signed and unsigned) , which were 
referred to by his brief and which were included in the 
Addendum, as required by the Rules. The Addendum also 
contained significant portions of the Transcript of Trial and 
Exhibits on some major factual issues. 
References to the Record or the lack thereof are 
simply not dispositive as far as Mr Homer's appeal is 
concerned. The major thrust of his appeal is that there was 
insufficient findings made by the trial court concerning such 
"equitable" issues as alimony. 
Ms Homer's brief [pp. 6-8] is critical of his brief, 
claiming such is an unwarranted recitation of his personal 
interpretation of "equity". Divorce actions are supposed to 
be "equitable". So it is indeed fitting that the thrust of 
this appeal center around "equity". His brief certainly 
should champion his interpretation of what is "equitable". 
There would never be an appeal in a divorce case the parties 
always blandly accepted the the lower court's "definition" of 
"equity". 
Mr Homer's brief complies with the Rules and does 
contain the necessary references "to the Record". It is Ms 
Homer who, in the evidence presented to the trial court and 
in the "findings" prepared by her counsel, who has failed to 
comply with the requirements of the law. 
II 
THE TRIAL COURT'S FAILURE TO MAKE ADEQUATE FINDINGS 
Ms Homer's brief [p. 11] states: 
"Evidence before the court established that Mrs. 
Homer's expenses totalled $1706.56. (R. 114)1" 
(Emphasis added.) Her brief then recites portions of Findings 
Nos. 14 and 16, which indicated that Ms Homer had a monthly 
income of $1673. 
If her expenses were $1706.56 per month, then her 
"margin" (between her earnings without alimony and her 
expenses) is less than $34 per month. WHY THEN IS THE MONTHLY 
ALIMONY AWARD $150? 
Her monthly expenses of $1706.58 included amounts she 
claimed to pay for the parties' minor child, Melissa! Mr 
Homer was ordered to pay in excess of $400 per month as 
"child support" and "child care expenses". Thus, her 
available "revenue" is in excess of $2,073 and she has 
expenses of $1706 per month. She shouldn't need alimony on 
top of that! 
The trial court's brief "findings" certainly do not 
resolve what should be obvious from simple arithmetic; 
indeed, the "finding" is contrary to the evidence, as claimed 
by Ms Homer's own brief. 
The trial court's Finding [#16] makes no specific 
reference to her monthly expenses, makes no reference to her 
standard of living, and is similarly devoid of any reference 
to the potential of her becoming a "public charge". 
1
 Actually, the $1706.58 amount is found on Page 112 not 
114 of the Record, at ADDENDUM Al, herein. 
This Court has held it is "reversible error" for the 
trial court to fail to enter specific findings concerning the 
issues raised by an alimony award. The trial court must make 
findings on all material issues and those findings must be 
sufficiently detailed and consist of enough subsidiary facts 
to reveal the steps the court took to reach its conclusions 
on each factual issue presented. Marchant vs Marchant, 743 
P.2d 199 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1989). 
The issue of Ms Homer's "need" for alimony was 
vigorously contested at all stages of this action. In light 
of the foregoing, this Court cannot determine the steps the 
trial court took to reach its conclusion. As with Marchant, 
the findings entered by the trial court are insufficient to 
support an award of permanent alimony. Ms Homer's appellate 
counsel has conveniently chosen to overlook and ignore those 
two cases and the principles for which they stand. 
Ill 
ALIMONY IN A NO-FAULT DIVORCE 
This action was filed as a "no fault" (i.e. 
"irreconcilable differences") divorce under the statutory 
amendments recently adopted by the 1987 Legislature. 
In Haumont vs Haumont, 793 P.2d 421, (Utah Court of 
Appeals 1990) , this Court correctly noted that "no fault need 
be proven or inferred" (Id. at 427) in an action such as 
this. Haumont did not address the issue of the award of 
alimony in the "no fault" context, but rather reversed and 
remanded due to the trial court's failure to enter sufficient 
findings. Thus, this case is a case of first impression for 
this Court. 
The "old" cases cited by Ms Homer in her brief 
interpretting divorce actions NOT in a "no fault" context 
ought to be limited to their specific facts and law. 
Furthermore, we are in the 1990s: a time when the economic 
opportunities for women are many times what they were when 
those traditional "alimony" cases were developed. It is time 
to abandon those archaic concepts, particularly in the case 
of an ex-wife totally able to support herself. 
The Legislature, consistent with the national trend of 
"throw-away marriages" has adopted the "no fault" concept. 
The purpose thereof was to make divorce easier. That arguably 
laudible will not be met if the courts continue to award 
alimony in a "no fault" context; the parties will still fight 
over that. As judged from the number of appeals concerning 
that singular issue and the number of divorce modifications 
in which its termination is sought, the men appear not to 
enjoy paying alimony; that situation is going to be 
aggravated when the divorce was to be "no fault". If it is 
nobody's "fault", then why she the man be forced to pay his 
ex-wife? If the award of alimony is not to be characterized 
as a "punishment" (for the paying husband) or a "reward" (for 
the receiving wife), then there is not logical explanation 
for routinely denying the award of permanent alimony in 
so-called "short-term" marriages, while awarding it in 
"long-term" marriages. The recipient spouse even in a 
"short-term" marrriage might have become just as "accustomed 
to that standard of living". And after the marriage, she 
might just as likely to become a "public charge". 
Haumont recognizes the principle that nno fault is to be 
inferred", an award of alimony for the ostensible purpose 
of enabling the recipient spouse (Ms Homer) to "continue, as 
nearly as possible, in the lifestyle to which she has become 
accustomed" which has the exact opposite effect on Mr 
Homer: contrary to whatever the courts as bystanders to the 
transaction may have characterized it in the past, it's a 
penalty. Since it is she that is now "breaking the marital 
contract" , it should be he- the non-breaching party who 
ought to be entitled to "the lifestyle at which he has become 
accustomed". 
Obviously, the Court is placed in the unenviable 
position of, as one commentator put it, "dividing a single 
blanket to cover two beds." 
The instant case is dissimilar to that situation 
presented in Martinez vs Martinez, 754 P.2d 59 (Utah Court of 
Appeals, 1988). Ms Homer is a college-graduate with 
post-graduate education, employed in a full-time job in her 
own chosen career, with full medical and retirement benefits, 
living in the home that she purchased prior to the marriage 
when she was receiving no alimony from her previous husband. 
She claims to be "entitled" to alimony, strictly on the basis 
of Mr Homer's "ability to pay it". 
Ms Homer cites [p. 12] to the case of Davis vs Davis, 
749 P.2d 647 (Utah Supreme Court 1988), as authority for an 
award of "permanent alimony" in a "long-term marriage". Davis 
involved a 13-year marriage: almost TWICE AS LONG as the 
instant relationship terminated at 7 years. And in Davis, Mr 
Davis had after-alimony annual income approaching $100,000. 
Davis is more applicable to Ms Homer in this case for 
the issues described by Justice Howe in his concurring 
opinion: 
She is . . . healthy, and well-educated. She 
has worked and continues to work full-time. She 
received a large cash settlement at the time of the 
divorce. . ., as well as substantial amounts of 
property. She was not left with any indebtedness 
incurred during the marriage, . . . Assuming she 
continues to [work] and invests the proceeds of the 
settlement, she is in a strong financial position 
without additional support from plaintiff. 
. . . 
Thus, the district court's award of permanent 
alimony was an abuse of discretion when reviewed 
under the criteria established by this Court. This 
is not the type of situation where an award of 
permanent alimony, or any alimony whatsoever, is 
warranted. 
749 P.2d at 650 (Justice Howe, concurring and dissenting). 
Emphasis added. 
Assuming that a major element necessary for an award of 
permanent alimony is the "standard of living issue enjoyed by 
the spouse during marriage", that criteria should not be 
followed in a "no fault" case. An award of alimony in a "no 
fault" case encourages the break-up of the marital and family 
relationships: the spouse gets to live in the "standard of 
living to which she has become accustomed, but without making 
the agreed-upon contributions or commitment which supposedly 
were the basis of the marital relationship. Such "judicial 
logic" conflicts with the expressed "public policy" of Utah: 
"to take reasonable measures to preserve marriages, 
particularly where minor children are involved." Section 
30-3-11.1, Utah Code. 
It is ironic that in a state which prides itself both 
in the expressed legislative policy as well as in the 
attitudes of the majority of its people in the integrity of 
families and the institution of marriage, judicial policies 
are applied in a fashion which encourage divorce, thus 
undermining those policies. 
Secondly, the award of permanent alimony in this case 
raises issues of "constitutional" dimension. The relatively 
new "no fault" character of this action highlights and 
refines the "constitutional" issues, which Ms Homer's brief 
(pp. 9-10) does not even address. Except for a brief 
reference that Mr Homer's "constitutional" issue is 
"unsupportable" (p. 9 of Ms Homer's brief), she choses not 
even to address this issue which apparently has never been 
raised, probably due to the recent vintage of the "no-fault" 
statute. 
A major element in the "alimony" analysis is the "keep 
the recipient spouse from becoming a public charge" issue. In 
Nollan vs California Coastal Commission, 483 US 825, 97 LEd2d 
677, 107 SCt 3141 (1987), the United States Supreme Court 
ruled that the Fourteenth Amendment prevented state 
government from "taking private property for public use" 
without just compensation. Certainly Nollan is not a "divorce 
case", but the constitutional principle applies: "private 
property" (from Mr Homer's future earnings) cannot be "taken 
for public use" (for the purpose of insuring that Ms Homer 
does not become a "public charge")! Those principles are 
consistent with the ruling in Colman vs Utah State Land 
Board, 795 P.2d 622 (Utah Supreme Court, 1990), interpretting 
Article I, Section 22 of the Utah Constitution: "Private 
property shall not be taken or damaged for public use without 
just compensation." Those two cases raise serious questions 
as to the "constitutionality" of any alimony award, 
especially a "no fault" divorce alimony award. That this 
"constitutional" issue has not been previously addressed by 
the appellate courts should not prevent Mr Homer from now 
litigating it. 
IV 
THE CHILD SUPPORT ISSUES 
A. The "dependency exemption" under federal tax law 
Ms Homer's brief [p. 14] implies that the "dependency 
exemption" allowed under Section 152 of the federal Internal 
Revenue Code was a major issue which was actively litigated 
and that he "lost" the fight in the trial court below for the 
"dependency exemption". Later her brief [p. 15] states that 
this issue is raised for the first time on appeal. Such 
mutually-inconsistent statements are both incorrect. 
The "dependency exemption", per se, was not mentioned in 
the course of the proceedings; however, the income tax 
consequences attendant to the custody award were mentioned at 
trial. Mr Homer's position was not to seek the "dependency 
exemption." It was beneficial to the parties jointly, and 
especially Ms Homer, that she be entitled to keep the 
"dependancy exemption" under federal law, so as to enable her 
to file income taxes in even a lower "tax bracket" (i.e. 
"head of household") than would have been the case is she had 
to file merely as "single". However, the "income tax 
consequences" were addressed by Mr Homer. At page 160 of the 
Transcript of the Trial, he in response to inquiry as to 
why the child support amount should be stated to be less than 
the amount specified in the "guidelines" stated: 
MR. HOMER: "Furthermore the schedules and the 
process do not take into account the custody issue 
and the tax consequences attendant to the parties 
of who ends up with custody. And I think that 
should be taken into account in an equitable 
distribution of the assets and/or the child support 
amount that should be awarded." 
Transcript of Trial, p. 160. [ADDENDUM A2, herein] Ms Homer 
made no attempt to rebut this statement. 
The specific impact as to the actual effect was sought 
to be addressed in the "Supplemental Findings of Fact", as 
prepared by Mr Homer and submitted to the trial court. 
Specifically, Proposed Findings # 33, 34, 35 and 36 addressed 
this issue, included in Mr Homer's original Brief at p. A37 
of the Addendum. 
The filing status and the rates at which the taxes would 
be calculated are "matters of law" (state and federal), 
easily determinable by judicial notice, if necessary and 
for which there is no dispute. Ample factual evidence was 
presented to establish the parties1 incomes. Nevertheless, 
inspite of the express request to make a "finding" on that 
issue, the trial court refused, tersely stating: 
The Court has also received and reviewed the 
"Supplemental Findings of Fact", prepared by 
defendant. The Court will not execute those 
proposed findings as they do not accurately reflect 
the Court's ruling in it's [sic] memorandum 
decision, and because much of the material 
contained in the "Supplemental Findings of Fact" is 
not relevant, and appears to be an attempt by 
defendant to relitigate the case. 
[Trial Court's October 26, 1989, memoradum decision, at p. 
268 of the Record; at p. A4 of Appellant's original brief.] 
In Motes vs Motes, 786 P.2d 232, 121 Utah Advance 
Reports 54 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1989), this Court declared 
that the trial court 
"must always recognize the financial benefit 
accompanying dependency exemption when awarding 
alimony and child support." 
786 P.2d at 239. Emphasis added. The "must always recognize" 
standard imposed upon the trial court is even stronger than a 
"judicial notice" standard. The trial court failed to do 
this, even when Mr Homer expressly called it out in his 
testimony. 
Even when the issue was specifically called out to the 
trial court in the "Supplemental Findings", the trial court 
refused to sign the "findings" not because they were not 
accurate, but because (1) they were not included in the trial 
court's earlier Memorandum Decision, (2) were irrelevant, or 
(3) were an attempt to relitigate the case. 
The trial court's original (July 31, 1989) Memorandum 
Decision makes absolutely no reference to any income tax 
consequences. The fact that the trial court omits to dispose 
of an issue cannot be the basis for refusing to consider it, 
particularly when it is brought to its attention, especially 
when the Court of Appeals has said that "the trial court must 
always recognize" the tax consequences. If the reason for the 
trial court's reticence to sign Supplemental Findings ## 
33-36 was that such " rel i t igated" the case, such a 
characterization is perhaps the highest compliment as to the 
integrity and accuracy of that finding. The purpose of the 
findings including "Supplemental Findings" prepared by the 
"losing" party are to enable the appellate court to 
determine the thought processes of the trial judge. The trial 
judge cannot refuse to sign a finding merely because it 
didn't fit into his original disposition of the case or he 
felt it was "irrelevant". 
Contrary to the assertions of Ms Homer's brief [p. 14] , 
the child support "guidelines" (tables) DO NOT take into 
account the income tax consequences which come from the 
custody award. The "guidelines" couldn't take those tax 
consequences into account, as the "guidelines" themselves are 
"CUSTODY-NEUTRAL": the calculations as to the monthly support 
to be paid by each parent are made using the guidelines 
without regard to which parent has custody. 
Ms Homer states that the "guidelines" are "adjusted for 
FICA, federal and state taxes"; indeed, the statute (Section 
78-45-7.14, Utah Code) even says so, although the word 
"adjusted" is unexplained. However, to say that this sentence 
overrules the principles announced in Motes is incorrect. 
That sentence refers to the tables as to how "monthly 
combined adjusted gross income" is calculated; its purpose 
was to reflect the fact that the Legislature ostensibly 
considered the impact of taxes generally when setting the 
guidelines. The purpose of the sentence is to insure that the 
"gross" income figure not the "net" income (following 
deductions for FICA and taxes) will be utilized. 
The "taxes" paid by parties could not be taken into 
account because the parties might have differing "marginal 
rates" (the rates at which the federal tax bracket jumps from 
15% to 28% of taxable income). Because the tables utilize 
only a "combined" monthly income/ there could be no taking 
into account of the taxes to be paid, by the parties, 
vis-a-vis each other, which was the whole purpose behind the 
principles announced in Motes. 
The fact that the tax consequences are not taken into 
account can be readily seen by the instant case. The 
mathematical calculations are adequately document in 
Appellant's initial brief and need not be repeated here. 
The amount by which Ms Homer's income taxes are reduced 
(which is the same amount by which Mr Homer's income taxes 
are increased) should be equitably divided, in the same 
manner as the child support obligation is divided. 
Instead, the trial court ignored the issue presented to 
it. Motes says it "must always be considered". If Ms Homer 
does not want the "child support amount" to be equitably 
reduced to take into account those tax consequences, then she 
ought to be forced to give up the "dependency exemption" as 
Motes allows. 
Motes is exactly applicable to the instant situation, 
where Mr Homer (the non-custodial parent) has the "higher 
income" and provides "the majority of the support". 
B. Child support paid for children of previous marriage 
Mr Homer paid and continues to pay $300 "child support" 
for children of a previous marriage, even though only $200 
was "ordered" for two children. This is not merely an issue 
of following the statute, as she suggests in her brief [p. 
16]. 2 The statute allows the trial court "discretion" in 
taking into account payments which are less than what was 
ordered, equity would demand that Mr Homer be given credit 
for paying more a situation the Legislature certainly 
didn1t envision. 
It is certainly inequitable for Ms Homer to contest this 
point, since she's claiming their child (Melissa) is 
entitled to $351.75 worth of support from Mr Homer, but that 
his other children from a previous marriage are only worth 
$100 each. That inequity is illustrated by the fact that the 
net impact to her is a mere $6 per month: the actual costs of 
providing for Melissa are not increased or decreased ONE 
PENNY by any of this. No, the focus is whether there's a 
signed paper in a dusty court file somewhere. If there is, 
then she'll take the $6 less per month. 
2
 One can but wonder what her position would be if Mr Homer did 
NOT PAY the court-ordered $200. Would she thus argue for an 
increase in the child-support to be paid for Melissa, because 
of his increased "adjusted income"? 
1 A 
Divorce actions including the award of child 
support are "equitable". Equity does what ought to be done; 
in close cases, "equity" will overrule "law". The policy of 
this state should not be to discourage non-custodial parents 
from PAYING MORE CHILD SUPPORT than is ordered, because of 
hypertechnical adherence to a statute. The "policy" of the 
state be such that the "guidelines" are that and that the 
trial judges have "discretion" for such cases, which 
discretion ought to be followed to advance the obvious goals 
of the statute. 
Indeed, the trial court did abuse that discretion. 
C. The "child care expenses" component 
Concerning the the "child care expenses" component of 
the child support award, Ms Homer's brief [p. 16] states 
that to "have even raised this issue on appeal without doing 
basic research into the law is an abuse of the appellate 
process." Such is an absolute misrepresentation of law and 
fact! 
This case was tried in the summer of 1989. The decree 
was finally signed in October 1989. The appeal was filed in 
November and the issues on appeal were established through 
the "Docketing Statement", filed with the Court in December 
1989. The Docketing Statement preserved the "child care 
expenses" issue which had been argued unsuccessfully to the 
trial court. Mr Homer's brief addressed the issue. 
Section 78-45-7.163, Utah Code, which arguably renders 
moot this particular issue, was amended by the 1990 
Leg islature pursuant to H.B. 103! The 1990 Edition of the 
Utah Code books published by Michie Company by which this 
amendment could be publicly-determined, were not even 
available until August 1990 AFTER Mr Homer's Appellant's 
Brief was written and filedl 
His position is certainly justified; it is not an "abuse 
of the appellate process". On the contrary, his position on 
the point seems to be well taken, as the Legislature adopted 
the position he sought, but was refused by the trial court, 
even when it was specifically called to his attention. In 
pursuing his appeal, he certainly could not predict that the 
Legislature would, in a subsequent year, adopt legislation 
addressing the very situation he felt inequitable. 
3
 Section 78-45-7.16, arfcapiled by the 1990 Legislature AFTER 
THIS APPEAL WAS FILED, now reads: 
(1) The monthly amount to be paid for reasonable 
work-related child care costs actually incurred on behalf of 
the dependent children of the parents shall be specified as a 
separate monthly amount in the order. 
(2) If an actual expense included in an amount specified in 
the order ceases to be incurred, the obligor may suspend 
making monthly payment of that expense while it is not being 




Ms Homer's brief [p. 17] notes that the "worksheet" and 
the "findings" and "conclusions" call out the "child care 
expenses" component and that Mr Homer can be excused from 
paying that component when those costs are no longer 
incurred. While there still may be a problem with the 
"decree" (which includes the amount, without actually saying 
so which was the whole point of the appeal), Mr Homer is 
willing to concede this issue is now moot and that pursuant 
to the provisions of Rule 37(a), Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure, the Appellant suggests4 that in light of the 1990 
legislative amendments to Section 78-45-7.16, Utah Code, the 
issues raised in POINT VII of APPELLANT'S BRIEF [pp. 43-45] 
are "moot" and that no dispute thereon is presented. The 
Appellant submits herewith a "Suggestion of Mootness", in the 
form contained in ADDENDUM A3, hereto. 
V 
DIVISION OF THE PENSION BENEFITS 
A. The "pension" account 
Contrary to Ms Homer's assertion [p. 18 of her brief], 
Mr Homer has NEVER, NEVER either in the trial court or in 
this appeal claimed that the "pension" account (adopted by 
4
 Pursuant to Rule 37, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Ms 
Homer's counsel has a "duty . . . at all times during the 
course of an appeal" to inform the court of any circumstances 
which have transpired subsequent to the filing of the appeal 
which would render moot one or more of the issues raised. 
That party shall "forthwith advise" the appellate court 
thereon. It is interesting that Ms Homer's counsel is so 
quick and critical (by using terms like "abuse of the 
judicial process") of Mr Homer's failure to predict the 
legislative will, when arguably much time and effort might 
have been saved had she notified the Court and Mr Homer of 
the amendments to 78-45-7.16, which became effective 23 April 
1990, in a timely manner. 
his employer as a substitute for federal social security 
coverage) was "exempt from division" by the divorce court. 
This is NOT an issue of a statute (or lack thereof) which 
prevents the "division" of the account upon divorce. The 
issue is one of simple equity. 
The court should take into account the "penalty" which 
will be imposed upon him by reason of the federal "Windfall 
Elimination Provision", which WILL reduce his federal social 
security benefits in the future. Randy Marchant, an employee 
of the social security administration, testified as to the 
"Windfall Elimination Provision". [TRANSCRIPT at pp. 86-91, 
contained in the ADDENDUM (A64 thru A69) to Mr Homer's 
original brief.] 
The "Windfall Elimination Provision" has been on the 
books since 1983; it was adopted by Congress for the specific 
purpose of discouraging the exodus of state and local 
government employees to ''private plans" in lieu of social 
security, as they were then but no longer allowed to do. 
The fact that the "Provision" has no present impact is of no 
consequence to the analysis; it is there now and, given 
Congress1 seemingly-apparent intent to adopt legislation to 
include everyone in the social security system, the Provision 
will be around permanently. 
To quote from Ms Homer's own brief [p. 23, citing to 
Woodward vs Woodward, 656 P.2d 431 (Utah 1982): 
In Englert vs Englert we emphasized the equitable 
nature of proceedings dealing with family, pointing 
out that the court may take into consideration all 
of the pertinent circumstances. 
1R 
Id. at 432. Citations omitted. Emphasis added. Indeed, the 
federal law (denying her benefits by reason of his 
employment) and the impact of the Windfall Elimination 
Provision should have been one of the "pertinent 
circumstances" which the trial court took into account in 
making an "equitable" distribution. The trial court closing 
its eyes to the issue merely pulled out the sword of 
justice and divided the baby in equal halvesl 
B. Set-off for expenses of step-children 
Contrary to the assertions of Ms Homer's brief [p. 23] , 
taking into account contributions to the living expenses of 
step children will not "completely negate" the statutory duty 
of a step-parent to support stepchildren; it will further 
that policy. 
If such contributions are taken into account, 
step-parents will be more willing to make those contributions 
for those children, knowing that if there is a divorce, the 
assets will be "equitably" adjusted. If Ms Homer's position 
should prevail (that there be no set-off), then persons will 
be reluctant to make those expenses. Instead, the step-parent 
will be motivated to "hoard" his monies against the time when 
the divorce occurs, particularly when one party 
announces as Ms Homer did that she will file for divorce 
three years in the future (1987) , which she did! [TRANSCRIPT 
at p. 165-166, contained in ADDENDUM A70-A71 of Mr Homer's 
original brief.] 
In Martinez vs Martinez, 754 P.2d 59 (Utah Court of 
Appeals, 1988), Mrs Martinez was under the same "statutory 
duty" to support her husband. Yet on the demise of her 
marriage, she was entitled to "equitable restitution" for the 
investment she had made. Mr Homer is merely asking for the 
same thing: not in terms of alimony as was awarded to Mrs 
Martinez, but rather as an "offset" against her claim in a 
share of his retirement accounts the single asset of any 
signficant value. 
C. Date of valuation of retirement account assets 
Ms Homer1s brief fails to even respond to the numerous 
cases cited for the proposition that the retirement assets 
ought to be valued as of the date the action was filed. It is 
on that date that Ms Homer ceased to be a marital "partner". 
She should now not be heard to criticise of utilization of 
that date. 
Ms Homer's citation [p. 22] of Jense vs Jense, 784 P.2d 
1249 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1989), is clearly erroneous. 
Jense involved a post-decree request for modification on 
the basis that property values in the agreed-upon settlement 
had not materialized. Jense doesn't even discuss the "general 
rule" as to the date of property valuation. 
In any event, those cases which might have been cited 
for that general rule involve either (1) property which it is 
difficult to obtain a precise value on, particularly in the 
past and/or (2) a relatively short time between the filing 
for the divorce and its ultimate disposition. Mr Homer is 
merely asking for a common-sense refinement to that general 
o n 
rule in cases such as this where the increase in value occurs 
because of his continued post-filing contributions. 
Although the "general rule" might be to the contrary, 
the application of the earlier valuation date in "retirement" 
account cases such as this is meritorious. First, it does not 
reward one party at the expense the other by dragging out 
the litigation. And even if such was not intentional, she 
still chose to terminate the "marital partnership" as of the 
earlier date. Secondly, such an approach would be consistent 
with the stated policy of encouraging the "preservation" of 
the marriage, particularly when minor children are involved. 
Ms Homer's brief [pp. 21-22] counters his arguments by 
quoting the trial court's analysis and disposition of this 
issue. However, when examined, the trial court's approach is 
contradictory to the "policy", is contrary to the law, and 
even contradicts itself. The trial court wrote: 
Had the Defendant wished to limit the plaintiff's 
interest in payments made to retirement programs 
during the pendency of this litigation, he could 
have moved for a bifurcated proceeding, and could 
likely have ended the marriage shortly after the 
action was filed. Plaintiff is entitled to a 
percentage of whatever benefits were accrued during 
the time of entry into the marriage, and final 
termination of the marriage through this divorce 
action. 
The better and certainly more "equitable" (both in terms of 
"fairness" and just common sense) approach would have been 
something along the lines of "if Plaintiff had wanted an 
interest in the Defendant's retirement programs, she 
shouldn't have filed for divorce, kicked him out and ceased 
being the marital 'partner' she originally contracted to be." 
There is nothing in the statutes which even describe, 
let alone provide for this questionable practice of having a 
"bifurcated hearing" to which the trial judge referred. The 
defendant-spouse is forced to likewise file (or at least move 
with dispatch to the divorce, lest the spouse continue to 
leech from his personal earnings and benefits) for divorce. 
Such certainly is contrary to the legislative policy! Indeed, 
it is time for that policy to be changed, as has been done in 
many other states. 
The trial court implies through its reference to the 
"bifurcated proceeding" that the assets would have been 
valued and divided as of the earlier date, even though the 
property distribution portion of the "bifurcated hearing" 
would be held at a later time: in this case, two years laterl 
That simply doesn't make sense. First, the bifurcated hearing 
is not provided for in the statute; secondly, to force the 
defending party to also file (or at least seek the divorce 
quickly) is contrary to the public policy described; and 
thirdly, it is conceptually impossible or as a minimum, 
contrary to the statute for the court to enter the divorce 
decree and yet fail to resolve the outstanding property 
distribution issues. 
Indeed, the trial court1s ruling is inconsistent with 
itself. It implies that the trial court would have valued and 
divided the assets as of the earlier date had the 
mysterious "bifurcated hearing" been held and yet goes on 
to say that she'd be "entitled" to a percentage of "whatever 
retirement benefits were accrued during the time of entry 
22 
into the marriage and final termination of the marriage 
through this action." Such an analysis totally ignores the 
evidence before the court: not necessary testimonial evidence 
presented at trial, but rather the documentary evidence in 
the court file itself, to the effect that she has, in fact 
terminated the marriage! 
If such "bifurcated" proceedings are allowed, then such 
should come from the Legislature, in expressed terms. 
They should not come by judicial decision or local court 
practice, particularly when such has an effect so contrary to 
the public policy of the this state. 
Respectfully submitted this 29th day of October, 1990. 
Defendant-Appellant Pro Se 
CERTIFICATE 
I certify that I caused four copies of the foregoing 
APPELLANT'S REPY BRIEF to be hand-delived to the office of Ms 
Helen E Christian, Attorney at Law, 48 Post Office Place, 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101, this 29th day of October, 1990. 
Husband Wife 
Rent or mortgage payments (residence) 
Real property taxes (residence) 
Real property insurance (residence) 
Maintenance (residence) 
Food and household supplies 
Utilities including water, elec, gas & heat 
Telephone 
Laundry and c l e a n i n g 
C l o t h i n g 
Medica l 
D e n t a l 
I n s u r a n c e ( l i f e , h e a l t h , a c c i d e n t , comprehensive 
d i s a b i l i t y ) Exclude p a y r o l l deducted 
Ch i ld Care 
Payment of child/spousal support re prior 
marriage 
School 
Entertainment (includes clubs, social obligations, 
travel, recreation) 
Incidentals (grooming, tobacco, alcohol, gifts, 
donations, including tithing) 
Transportation (other than automobile) 
Auto expense (gas, oil, repair, insurance 
Auto payments 
Installment payments (insert total and attach 
itemized schedule if not fully set forth in (d) 
Other expenses (insert total and specify on a 
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that — It doesn't cost that much. I find it 
interesting that for seven years $115 was enough, for 
seven years $200 for Kirk and Daniel. 
MR. JOHNSON: Judge, I object. 
It's not responsive. 
THE COURT: I will sustain the objection. Just 
stick to the facts per the question that was asked. 
TNESS: As the father of Melissa and havinq 
resided in the home as being a noncustodial parent who 
visits her, and I am familiar with the living 
arrangements and the expenses attendant to those living 
arrangements, they are not as high as what the schedules 
would dictate would work out. 
Furthermore the schedules and the process 
do not take into account the custody issue and the tax 
consequences attendant to the parties of who ends up 
with custody. And I think that should be taken into 
account in an equitable distribution of the assets 
and/or the child support amount that should be awarded. 
Q. Okay. Now should she receive half your 
retirement? 
A. No. 
Q. Why not? 
A. In September of f87 Kathy legally called it 
quits. She took legal steps to terminate the marriage. 
STEPHEN G HOMER 
P 0 Box 493 
West Jordan, Utah 84084 
Telephone 561-14 63 
Defendant-Appellant Pro Se 




STEPHEN HOMER, j 
Defendant-Appellant ] 
) SUGGESTION OF MOOTNESS 
i Docket No. 890689-CA 
Pursuant to the provisions of Rule 37 of the Utah Rules 
of Appellate Procedure, the Defendant-Appellant hereby 
suggests that one of the issues raised in the above-entitled 
action is moot: namely, the reduction of "child care 
expenses", as described in Paragraph 5.f of the "Docketing 
Statement" (filed December 1989) and argued under Point VII 
of Appellant's Brief [pp. 43-45], written and filed before 
the 1990 legislative enactments were publicly available. 
The mootness on this singular issue arises by reason of 
the 1990 Legislature's adoption of H.B. 106, which made 
amendments to Section 78-45-7.16, Utah Code, authorizing the 
very result which the Appellant sought in that portion of the 
appeal. 
Based upon the statements made on page 17 of the 
Plaintiff-Respondent's Reply Brief, dated 25 September 1990/ 
A L N I S C * P K I ^ A A r^ 
it is the undersigned's belief that counsel for the opposing 
party would concur in this Suggestion of Mootness. 
The Court may dispose of the mooted issue as the Court 
deems appropr iate. 
Respectfully submitted this 29th day of October, 1990. 
I certify that I caused a copy of the foregoing SUGGESTION OF 
MOOTNESS to be hand-delivered to the office of Helen E 
Christian, Attorney at Law, 48 Post Office Place, Salt Lake 
City, Utah 84101, this 29th day of October, 1990. 
